spread across borders developed within a particular domestic setting, and might not thrive on foreign soil. To better grasp the extent and dynamics of cross-national activism, one must therefore take a closer look at the micro sociological mechanisms affecting the behavior of societal and political actors at the domestic level. A comparative approach can yield valuable insights.
Following a triptych well established among students of societal mobilization, work on the cross-national diffusion of protest has typically underlined three types of conditions: the existence of mobilizing structures; cultural proximity or similarity; and favorable political opportunities (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995, 188-91; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Tarrow 1998) . It is the latter that is privileged here. The notion of 'political opportunity structure' (POS) can be defined as those 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success and failure' (Tarrow 1998: 85) . In their more static form, political opportunity structures generally refer to different levels of institutional access to policy makers, which alter the likelihood of protest (e.g. Kitschelt 1986 ). However political opportunity structures can also be determined by changing political environments, in which elected officials and political oppositions can both mediate the impact of transnational activism. In some cases, new political opportunities can even be seized upon by challengers and used to pry open institutional barriers. Unstable political alignments, divided elites, influential allies and support groups all become critical aspects of political opportunity (Tarrow 1998: 78-80) . Last, political opportunity structures possess a cultural dimension since political opportunity may depend less on objective facts than on actors' perceptions that chances of success are opening up (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) .
While acknowledging that institutional access and shifting political environments may exert a significant impact on domestic mobilizations, it is this latter dimension that we wish to explore here from two different angles, both comparatively understudied in the context of global activism. The first concerns the effects of emulation and competition between different groups of domestic activists, as these can both expand and limit perceived political opportunities. On the one hand, past or concomitant social movement activity may exert a 'structural' impact on existing political opportunity structures by encouraging mobilization through a demonstration effect (Kitschelt 1986: 62) . In the case of past movements, there may even be organizational remnants in the domestic political environment, 'holdovers' that will provide the necessary social underpinning for future action (Almeida 2003: 350) . On the other hand, scholars working at the border between POS and cultural approaches to mobilization have argued that the success of a particular movement will depend on the congruence of its mobilizing message with that of the 'master frame' shaping the whole cycle of protest within a given polity (Snow and Benford 1992; Diani 1996) . By helping to define which issues and repertoires have the greatest mobilization potential in the national context, past or concomitant movements may thus enhance or reduce activists' ability to take advantage of perceived changes in the political opportunity structure, such as greater institutional access, divided elites or international openness. Not only can 'objective' opportunities be missed; the scope for constructing, by rhetorical means, new political opportunities may also be reduced.
In the case of transnational protests, perceived political opportunities are also bound to be affected by multilevel decision-making and activism. In one of few attempts to factor in the interactions between international and domestic governance, Kathryn Sikkink looks at international opportunity structures, i.e. 'the degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOS, networks and coalitions' (Sikkink 2005: 156) . Combining international openness with national openness helps account for differentiated patterns of activism around transnational issues. For instance, closure in both political arenas is likely to discourage mobilization; however a combination of international closure and domestic openness should result in 'defensive transnationalization'. This time, activists will engage in a broad repertoire of political activities at the domestic level, and try through their impact on domestic governments to gain more access to international institutions. By the same token, David Meyer suggests looking at how domestic political opportunity structures are 'nested' within their larger international environment, and how changes in the international context, or perceptions thereof, can alter the opportunities for activists within domestic settings (Meyer 2003) .
International institutions and regimes provide not only targets but, most significantly, arenas for social movement activity. Heads of state may successfully take advantage of international gatherings to press a new agenda, giving a previously remote policy area increased visibility and opening up new opportunities (or perceptions thereof) at the domestic level. Cross-border protests may provide focal points for activists, officials and the media, fostering new interorganizational ties and giving added publicity, even legitimacy to national actors (Kolb 2005) . The way domestic political opportunities interact with international access and transnational events cannot be overlooked.
In the end, four aspects of domestic political opportunity structures are therefore explored here: domestic institutional access; changing political environment; impact of past or concomitant movement activity; interactions with international opportunities. By establishing how well these account for differences in the scope, timing and dynamics of the 1990s campaign for the cancellation of poor country debt in our three countries, we hope to better assess their relative contribution to our understanding of cross-border protests. The next section takes a closer look at the three domestic campaigns. In a fourth section, explanations relating to the specific political settings in which the campaigns took place are suggested. A fifth section concludes.
THE DEBT CANCELLATION CAMPAIGN: NATIONAL INSIGHTS
Before presenting the three domestic campaigns, a few words on the transnational dimension of the anti-debt protest are in order. As mentioned in the introduction, the Jubilee 2000 campaign rapidly established itself as the epitome of successful crossborder campaigns in the area of international finance. The coalitions that were fostered in well over fifty countries encompassed churches, anti-poverty groups, trade unions and a myriad of other organizations, many of which had not worked on debt issues before. Campaigners targeted a network of creditor countries and international financial institutions previously thought to be largely impervious to external influence, yet managed to extract commitments and actual (if sometimes limited) policy changes. In accounting for this overall success, 'global' elements have often been emphasized: the role of the internet in enabling collaboration within and across countries; that of the news media in spreading awareness and achieving maximum leverage from celebrity involvement; the focus on G7 Summits and IMF/World Bank annual meetings. Yet another, equally striking ingredient of the campaign was the autonomy left to national coalitions, each of which created its own decision-making structure, and to member organizations within. Tensions were rife: between South and North, reformists and radicals, even at times between the UK coalition and others (notably the US) over perceived efforts to assert global leadership around the campaign (see in particular Donnelly 2000). But crucially (perhaps inevitably) the transnational network underpinning the protest remained highly decentralized, functioning as a coalition of autonomous campaigns. It is this national dimension that we want to capture here, by looking at patterns of mobilization in three creditor countries: Britain, Germany and France.
Britain: the irrepressible Jubilee 2000 Coalition
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition grew out of an alliance of aid agencies, the Debt Crisis Network (DCN), led by the New Economics Foundation, Christian Aid and the World Development Movement, which had been working on the debt issue since the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (Pettifor 1998; Dent 1999 
Institutional access
Among the differences often pointed out in the comparative politics literature on the three countries, those relating to institutional access, and especially the way authorities have traditionally dealt with challengers, figure quite prominently. In Britain, inclusive strategies have generally prevailed, albeit of an informal nature. In Germany, despite an overall exclusive strategy challengers could count on some formal access, an important element behind the success of the new social movements.
In France however, 'selective exclusion' has been the rule, the state only settling for substantive concessions if the social movement's demands happened to correspond to the political goals of the governing coalition. This, according to social movement theorists, generally discouraged broad mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1995: 36 Contacts also existed between the federal government and the members of 432-6). Debt cancellation was largely framed as a necessary precondition for Southern citizens and governments to reject the diktats of the IMF-G7-commercial banks nexus (ATTAC 2002: 122-8) , rather than as a matter of social justice or even growth and development per se. However, debt relief struggled to emerge as a mobilizing cause, and from 2000 on remained best seen as one element of a broadening altermondialiste agenda.
International opportunities
Finally, the coincidence between explicit political support, mobilization surges and Finally, the importance of past or parallel social movement activity was apparent. Not only did it explain the different rhetoric used in the three countries; it was also essential in accounting for the scope, and even more the sustainability, of mobilization efforts. In the UK past movement activity appeared to have considerably broadened the appeal of (and opportunities open to) the Jubilee 2000 coalition. The successful Oxfam UK campaign established a precedent for both state and non-state actors; it left an institutional imprint in the form of the Debt Crisis Network; and, perhaps most importantly, it enshrined the debt issue in popular culture, defining a 'master frame' Jubilee 2000 would later draw on. More generally, the 1986 campaign and its follow ups opened up new opportunities for debt activists by enhancing expectations of success. In the absence of such legacy the German and the French campaigns struggled to impose their frame onto largely apathetic publics and officials; they also suffered from the competition of newcomer ATTAC, the message of which either blurred or marginalized their own.
More work is now needed on these two dimensions of political opportunity structures, both to better articulate the mechanisms at play and to test their relevance to other cross-national and cross-campaign comparisons. However, focusing on the articulation between domestic and international political opportunities and on the way pre-existing (or concomitant) movements and frames may interfere with cross-border diffusion should help shed more light on a phenomenon still under-studied from a comparative perspective: the rise of transnational activism. 
